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I. INTRODUCTION
Of the twenty largest public company bankruptcy filings from 1980 to
the present, seventeen have taken place since 2001, and ten of those
seventeen were filed between March of 2007 and August of 2009.1 One
such example is In re Chrysler LLC, in which Chrysler, on April 30, 2009,
filed for protection under Title 11 of the United States Code.2 For the
twelve-month period ending on December 31, 2008, the Chrysler
companies suffered a staggering $16.8 billion loss.3 The failure of such
large companies and the distribution of their enormous wealth of assets
have and will continue to have major repercussions.4 The Bankruptcy Code
provides these massive businesses with different options for filing
bankruptcy, and these options have reverberating economic and societal
effects well beyond any one company‘s interests. It is thus essential to
understand the options provided by the Bankruptcy Code and to ensure
they provide for the most advantageous possible outcomes when America‘s
foundational businesses collapse.
While Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is the traditional guide for
corporate reorganization and the payment of creditors over time,5
Chrysler—following the current corporate trend—chose to proceed
pursuant to § 363.6 Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a
Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession, such as Chrysler, to ―use, sell, or lease‖
estate property outside the ordinary course of business.7 Section 363 sales
tend to be cheaper and more time efficient than reorganization
alternatives.8 Accordingly, in the last twenty-five years, § 363(b) asset
sales have become standard practice in large corporate bankruptcies.9
―Proponents of the Chapter 11 liquidation method into which § 363 has
evolved extol the speed, efficiency, and competition involved in the sales
as indications of its superiority over a more traditional reorganization.‖10
1. 20 Largest Public Company Bankruptcy Filings 1980 — Present,
BANKRUPTCYDATA.COM, http://www.bankruptcydata.com/Research/Largest_Overall_All-Time.pdf
(last visited Apr. 6, 2011).
2. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 87–88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
3. Id. at 89.
4. Corporate Bankruptcy & the Wall Street Bailout, TOTALBANKRUPTCY.COM,
http://www.totalbankruptcy.com/news/articles/miscellaneous/wall-street-bailout-and-corporatebankruptcies.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
5. Chapter 11: Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/chapter11.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2011).
6. 405 B.R. at 87.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006).
8. George W. Kuney, Let’s Make It Official: Adding an Explicit Preplan Sale Process as an
Alternative Exit from Bankruptcy, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1265, 1273 (2004).
9. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 115
(2d Cir. 2009).
10. Bryant P. Lee, Note, Chapter 18? Imagining Future Uses of 11 U.S.C. § 363 to
Accomplish Chapter 7 Liquidation Goals in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 520, 530.
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This trend toward use of § 363(b) is likely to grow as poor economic
conditions continue to increase creditor control over reorganization and
because of the lack of available financing to debtors, both of which tend to
fuel § 363(b) sales.11 Thus, the ―side door‖ of § 363(b) may soon ―replace
the main route of Chapter 11 reorganizations.‖12
Considering current declining economic conditions, the massive
amounts of wealth at stake, and the modern prevalence of § 363 sales in
large-scale corporate bankruptcy proceedings, it is prudent to ensure that
§ 363(b) provides a competent and just medium to protect the diverse
interests of all relevant parties and society as a whole. While § 363 sales,
on paper, appear to be the ideal way to maximize value for secured
creditors, preserve the going concerns of businesses, and keep workers on
the job,13 there is a well-founded fear that quick asset sales run the risk of
circumventing the Chapter 11 process.14 In re Chrysler LLC highlights the
concerns of courts and academics that § 363 fails to adequately protect the
interests of companies‘ smaller debt and equity holders15 and ignores some
of the fundamental bankruptcy principles and protections.
Part II of this Note provides the basic framework of the Chrysler
bankruptcy agreement for the purposes of analyzing § 363 and the business
justification standard. Part III details the development of § 363(b) and three
of the primary dangers that exist with § 363(b) asset sales under business
justification analysis. Part III then uses the In re Chrysler LLC case to
highlight the issues in practice. The first issue is § 363(b) sales‘
vulnerability to construction as ―sub rosa‖ sales, which serve the same
purpose of reorganizations but avoid Chapter 11 protection requirements.16
The second issue is § 363(b) sales‘ potential to allow powerful creditors
too much influence and control, thereby subordinating and possibly
defeating the protected interests of smaller creditors.17 The third issue is
§ 363 sales‘exceedingly low return values for the assets sold off in spite of
their intended purpose of maximizing decreasing values.18 Part IV
addresses the current standard for approving § 363(b) sales, the business

11. Id. at 531.
12. Jason Brege, Note, An Efficiency Model of Section 363(b) Sales, 92 VA. L. REV. 1639,
1640 (2006).
13. Josef S. Athanas, Section 363 Bankruptcy Sales Attacked by Judges and Commentators
Just as Economic Conditions Make Them More Important than Ever, in BANKRUPTCY AND
RESTRUCTURING CHAPTER 11 STRATEGIES 2009, at 39, 56 (2009).
14. See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063,
1069–71 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales,
106 MICH. L. REV 1, 1, 3 (2007).
15. E.g., In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1069–71; see Brege, supra note 12, at 1643–44.
16. Cf. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700
F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983).
17. E.g., In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1069–70; see also Lee, supra note 10, at 524.
18. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 123 (returning an estimated value of $2 billion for
assets with a going concern value of approximately $25 billion); see also Lee, supra note 10, at
524.
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justification rule,19 and how the rule wrongly facilitates the approval of
dubious asset sales. Part V discusses academic theories for reform of the
current business judgment standard as well as its implementation in other
areas of the law. Lastly, Part VI synthesizes the differing approaches to the
business justification standard and offers a refined framework for assessing
§ 363 asset sales.
II. HIGHLIGHTING THE PROBLEM: IN RE CHRYSLER
On November 29, 2007, a $10 billion term loan maturing on August 2,
2013, was made available to Chrysler as a First Lien Credit Agreement.20
―Chrysler‘s obligations . . . [were] secured by a security interest in and first
lien on substantially all of Chrysler‘s [then-$39.3 billion in] assets.‖21 On
the date of filing, Chrysler owed the first-lien lenders approximately $6.9
billion under the loan.22 Later, ―under a Second Lien Credit
Agreement . . . Chrysler received a $2 billion term loan [maturing] on
February 3, 2014[,]‖ from affiliates of Daimler and Cerberus.23 The loan
agreement provided that the second-lien lenders had a second-priority
security interest in the same assets that secured the First Lien Credit
Agreement.24
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 established the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which allows the Secretary of the
Treasury to buy troubled assets in order to restore economic confidence
and to stimulate the economy.25 Chrysler borrowed $4 billion from the
U.S. Treasury under TARP, securing the financing by granting the
Treasury a first-priority lien on all unencumbered assets and a third-priority
lien on all other assets as collateral under the first and second lien
agreements.26 Chrysler ―also provided the U.S. Treasury with a separate
promissory note in the amount of $267 million,‖ which, along with the $4
billion TARP loan, matured no later than January 2, 2012.27 However, in
order to secure the loan and the note, Chrysler was required to submit a
plan to the government, its major creditor, showing a viable long-term
solution.28 Chrysler entered into a term sheet for strategic alliance with
Fiat, with whom it had been negotiating for some time prior to the issuance
of the loan.29 This Fiat Viability plan was accepted by the U.S. Treasury,
19. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1066, 1070; see also James Patrick Shea et al., Pushing
the Limits of Section 363—Is Confirmation Obsolete in the Asset Sale Case?, 14 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 2 art. 2, at 7–8 (2005) (stating that the business justification standard is still the prevalent
bankruptcy standard).
20. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5211 (West 2011).
26. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 89–90.
27. Id. at 89.
28. Id. at 90.
29. Id.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss4/4

4

Korres: Bankrupting Bankruptcy: Circumventing Chapter 11 Protections Thro

2011]

BANKRUPTING BANKRUPTCY

963

but only after Chrysler addressed certain governmental concerns.30
To satisfy Fiat and the governmental TARP loan concerns, New CarCo
Acquisition LLC (New Chrysler) was formed, and the parties created a
new collective bargaining agreement with United Automobile Workers
(UAW) to establish new wage structures and retirement settlement
agreements.31 This included a voluntary employees‘ beneficiary association
(VEBA) to fund health care obligations32. The agreement was funded by a
55% equity interest in New Chrysler as well as a $4.59 billion note.33
Ultimately, the final bankruptcy transaction agreement established that
Chrysler would transfer (by § 363(b) sale) all of its operating assets to New
Chrysler in exchange for $2 billion in cash and certain ―Old‖ Chrysler
liabilities.34 Fiat would contribute technology, distribution, and cost saving
capabilities to New Chrysler, and New Chrysler would issue relevant
interest in the company as follows: 55% to the VEBA, 20% to Fiat, and 8%
to the U.S. Treasury.35 Additionally, the Treasury agreed to provide
financing relating to the sale transaction in the amount of $4.96 billion for
60 days and $6 billion to support New Chrysler after the sale was
completed.36
The plaintiff in Chrysler, the ―Indiana Funds,‖37 filed an objection to
the sale motion.38 ―Indiana Funds [held] approximately $42 million of the
$6.9 billion in first priority secured claims . . . .‖39 The Indiana Funds
argued that, under the § 363 agreement, the first-lien lenders‘ collateral
would be stripped, and the first-lien lenders would receive twenty-nine
cents on the dollar for their investment.40 The collateral would then be
transferred to New Chrysler under the agreement. The plaintiffs believed
that the transferred collateral, in the hands of New Chrysler, was worth
significantly more than what the plaintiffs received as first-lien lenders.41
Additionally, the Indiana Fund‘s and all other senior claims would be
impaired in favor of the unsecured junior claims of the Government,
VEBA, and UAW, all of which receive considerable value under the
agreement.42 Lastly, the funds believed that Fiat should not receive a stake
in New Chrysler without providing cash contributions in addition to the

30. Id. at 91.
31. Id. at 91–92.
32. Id. at 92.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 93. Collectively, Indiana State Teachers Retirement Fund, Indiana State Police
Pension Trust, and Indiana Major Moves Construction comprise the ―Indiana Funds.‖ Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. (representing ―less than 1% of the first-lien debt‖).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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technological and distributional support provided.43 Put simply, as a small
and relatively insignificant creditor, Indiana Funds believed its supposedly
secured first-lien interest was wrongly losing out to the power and
influence of junior, unsecured loan creditors under the court-sanctioned
§ 363 restructuring. Right or wrong, the circumstances exposed the
shortcomings and manipulability of § 363 asset sales.
III. SECTION 363 AND ITS DANGERS IN PRACTICE
Section 363 asset sales have changed from what was originally
intended by the code‘s drafters and the bankruptcy courts.44 Section 363(b)
originated in the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 and permitted a sale of a debtor‘s
assets when the estate or any part of the estate was ―of a perishable nature,
or liable to deteriorate in value.‖45 Originally, § 363 transactions concerned
only expedited sales that were imperative to preserve values that would
rapidly diminish.46 Until the implementation of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, approval of asset sales required sufficient showing of cause
for circumventing standard Chapter 11 reorganization plans.47 However,
recently there has been a movement away from the emergency and cause
restrictions toward adopting more liberal standards for approving § 363
sales.48 The traditional aversion to unrestricted use of § 363 sales,49 and the
major decisions that restricted debtor‘s use of § 363 asset sales,50 have
given way to the business judgment standard‘s very broad application by
the courts.51 As evidenced in the Chrysler outcome, this broad standard is a
tool with which the courts can permit sub rosa sales, creditor manipulation,
and minimal realized asset values in § 363 sales, all of which fall well
short of standard bankruptcy protections.52
43. Id.
44. Robert G. Sable, Michael J. Roeschenthaler & Daniel F. Blanks, When the 363 Sale Is the
Best Route, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 art. 2, at 1 (2006).
45. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 25, 14 Stat 517, 528 (repealed 1878); see also Ind. State
Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2009).
46. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 113.
47. See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063,
1067, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983).
48. See Craig A. Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor
Protections in Chapter 11, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 37, 51 (1999) (permitting § 363 sales unless there is
an obvious reason not to).
49. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 113; see also In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1067.
50. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700
F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983) (establishing that sub rosa plans will not be upheld); In re Solar Mfg.
Corp., 176 F.2d 493, 494 (3d Cir. 1949) (stating that the sale of a debtor‘s assets outside of
reorganization should be confined to emergencies where the assets will lose all value without
immediate action).
51. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1066, 1070 (establishing the business justification
standard); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.01[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
15th rev. ed. 2009) (stating that amongst the courts there are different thresholds for permitting the
sale of assets outside a bankruptcy plan).
52. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
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A. Sub Rosa Sales
The concept of sub rosa (―below the line‖) plans first appeared in the
case of In re Braniff Airways, Inc.53 In discussing the validity of an
approved § 363 asset sale, the court said, ―[t]he debtor and the bankruptcy
court should not be able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for
confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the terms of the plan
sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets.‖54 Essentially, a § 363 plan is
sub rosa if, similar to basic Chapter 11 procedures, the remaining plan for
reorganization is predetermined according to the sale.55 The Braniff court
held that in future attempts to establish appropriate terms for § 363 plans,
parties and district courts ―must scale the hurdles erected in Chapter 11.‖56
It has been subsequently established that the rights of senior secured
creditors cannot be abrogated in § 363 plans and that bankruptcy courts
lack the authority to approve such transactions under § 363.57 However,
while the Braniff holding provided the language that courts have
subsequently used as guidance in sub rosa determinations, the court did
not explain the appropriate use or procedure of sub rosa objections, nor did
it specify any direct limitation on the use of § 363 sales.58 Despite the very
explicit determination by the courts that asset selling plans under § 363
must not simply be for the purpose of evading the standards of Chapter
11,59 through the lack of clarity in the business justification standard, these
are precisely the type of asset sales courts have subsequently approved.60 In
re Chrysler highlights this potential abuse.
B. Sub Rosa Approval in In re Chrysler
Beyond the actual form of the sale, the Chrysler ―sale‖ implements
everything that Chapter 11 plans are designed to accomplish without
enforcing of any of Chapter 11‘s mandated protections.61 The § 363 sale
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 9 (2005) (supporting the argument that courts‘ liberal § 363
standards have permitted unfathomably corrupt acts by large companies).
53. 700 F.2d at 940.
54. Id.
55. See Sloane, supra note 48, at 45.
56. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.),
700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983); see e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006) (disclosure requirements);
id. § 1126 (voting); id. § 1129(a)(7) (best interest of creditors test); id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)
(absolute priority rule).
57. Contrarian Funds, LLC v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc. (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 333
B.R. 30, 49–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
58. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d at 940.
59. Id.; In re Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 333 B.R. at 52.
60. See, e.g., Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d
108, 119 (2d Cir. 2009); In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 491, 495–96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009).
61. Brief for Appellants Indiana State Police Pension Trust et al. at 43, Ind. State Police
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 09-2311bk).
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reorganizes the finances and obligations of the debtors and determines the
handling of nearly all the creditors without disclosure requirements,62
voting,63 the best interest of the creditors,64 or the priority rule65 being
taken into account.66 Additionally, calling the transaction a sale is, in itself,
construing the word sale in the most literal and narrow way possible. The
proposed § 363 transaction is a sale only in name as the ―New Chrysler‖
established by the deal will operate exactly as the old Chrysler in every
substantive way.67 The brand name ―Chrysler,‖68 headquarters,69
employees, a majority of management,70 and lines of cars and trucks71 are
essentially the same under New Chrysler. Thus, Chrysler evaded the
procedural and substantive protections of Chapter 11 in reorganizing
pursuant to the § 363 sale, and in doing so, it achieved a result that could
not be reached through the standard Chapter 11 process.72 It is unlikely
that, in a proper Chapter 11 reorganization plan, first-lien lenders would
ever agree to accept value equal to roughly one third of their debt, unless
absolutely no alternatives were available.73 However, Chrysler was able to
sidestep this need for creditor approval by disguising the reorganization as
a § 363(b) asset sale.74 Chrysler then based the remainder of the deal on
this § 363(b) asset sale and hoped the court would not find it an
unacceptable sub rosa plan. Using the ambiguity of the § 363 business
justification standard, the court obliged.75
C. Influence of Creditors
Another concern is that the Bankruptcy Court‘s understanding of
adequate minor creditor protections potentially allows a powerful creditor
to ―run roughshod‖ over the rights of lesser creditors.76 In addressing
§ 363(b) asset sales, the In re Lionel court acknowledged the potential for

62. 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
63. Id. § 1126.
64. Id. § 1129(a)(7).
65. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
66. See Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108,
114 (2d Cir. 2009).
67. Brief for Appellants Indiana State Police Pension Trust et al., supra note 61, at 44.
68. Id. (citing Chrysler Master Transaction Agreement § 5.19(b)).
69. Id. (citing Chrysler Master Transaction Agreement § 11.01).
70. Id. (citing Chrysler Master Transaction Agreement § 6.01).
71. Id. (citing Chrysler Master Transaction Agreement, Recitals ¶ 2).
72. See supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text.
73. In bankruptcy first-lien lenders are the first to be satisfied. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)
(2006). Thus, first lien lenders would seek at least a value equivalent to the value of their interest
unless it was clear there was no alternative.
74. Id. §§ 363(b), 1126.
75. See Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108,
118–19 (2d Cir. 2009).
76. Contrarian Funds, LLC v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc. (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 333
B.R. 30, 49–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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creditor influence in the proceedings.77 ―‗[T]he natural tendency of a
debtor in distress [is] to pacify large creditors with whom the debtor would
expect to do business, at the expense of small and scattered public
investors.‘‖78 In placating these major creditors, debtors often enter into
debtor-in-possession financial arrangements involving restrictive
covenants that effectively give control to the creditor.79 This relationship
becomes particularly important when there are insufficient assets to protect
creditors‘ claims, and thus, creditors have more incentive to participate in
reorganizations and sales.80 Additionally, lesser creditors such as junior
secured creditors, unsecured creditors, trade creditors, and equity holders
have little ability to oppose decisions once pushed through by more
influential major creditors.81 Thus, the great danger is that highly invested
creditors will use their influence to dictate favorable terms or prices for a §
363(b) asset sale at the expense of junior or unsecured creditors who lack
the ability to protect their own interests.82 It appears that the courts are
aware of influential creditor dangers.83 However, courts have approved
plans undeniably dominated by the major creditors behind them.84 Thus, it
becomes clear that the inconsistent scrutiny of § 363 sales has allowed
debtors to manipulate standard bankruptcy protections.85 Put simply, there
is not an adequate standard to shield the system from unfair dealing and
abuse.86
D. Creditor Manipulation in In re Chrysler
In re Chrysler demonstrates that, alarmingly, courts can allow primary
first-lien lenders to have their interests usurped by the influence of major
creditors exerting influence in § 363(b) asset sales.87 In Chrysler, the U.S.
Treasury Department (Treasury) represented ―(i) the Debtors‘ prepetition
77. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1069
(2d Cir. 1983).
78. Id. at 1070 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, at 5796).
79. Lee, supra note 10, at 541–42.
80. Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11,
at 6 (Columbia Univ. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 321, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081661.
81. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 38–39.
82. See Contrarian Funds, LLC v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc. (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.),
333 B.R. 30, 49–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
83. See id. at 49–50; cf. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.),
722 F.2d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1983).
84. See Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108,
111–12 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding a government-driven sale of Chrysler over the objections of firstlien lenders); see also In re General Motors, 407 B.R. 463, 473–74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(upholding government-driven sale over objections of lesser lien holders).
85. See supra notes 82–84.
86. Elizabeth B. Rose, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(B): The Opportunity for Sweetheart
Deals Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 275 (2006).
87. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 111–12.
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third-lien lender, (ii) the Debtor‘s [debtor in possession] lender, (iii) the
exit finance lender, (iv) an equity holder in the purchaser, (v) a TARP
lender to the Administrative Agent, . . . and (vi) a TARP lender to both
Chrysler FinCo and GMAC.‖88 Thus, it is hardly surprising to find that
Chrysler did not even participate in negotiations with its two most
significant creditor groups.89 The debtor‘s own chief financial officer
testified that the Treasury essentially took over all major business decisions
and responsibilities.90 The Treasury even decided the time and venue for
filing of Chapter 11.91 The level of involvement by the major creditor in
this instance went well beyond influence; it was essentially direct control
by the Treasury to get its preferred outcome at the expense of other
lenders—in this case, the first-lien secured lenders. Unlikely as such an
outcome would seem under standard bankruptcy protections, the §363 plan
was approved through the business judgment loophole.92
E. Undervaluation of Assets
While some approve of the use of § 363 and the asset market‘s ability
to ―set efficient prices and ensure fair recoveries for all involved
creditors,‖93 in depressed economic climates, ―[a]s liquidity vanishes, so
too does the ability of potential purchasers to take advantage of any buying
opportunity. Less competition for the same assets generally creates an
expectation of a lower sale price . . . .‖94 Adequate information is often
only offered to small groups of interested parties, making informed
participation by outside parties extremely difficult and further reducing
competition and expected returns.95 Thus, rushed sales in depressed
markets may not generate bidders or value for encumbered assets, and as a
result, companies may be unable to fully satisfy existing creditors or to
move forward efficiently through reorganization.96. In 2007, a study
compared the effects of § 363 sales and traditional Chapter 11
reorganizations. Sixty companies were analyzed—half participated in
§ 363 sales and half in Chapter 11 reorganizations. Not surprisingly, the
88. Brief for Appellants Indiana State Police Pension Trust et al., supra note 61, at 73. In late
2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 established the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP), which allows the Secretary of the Treasury to buy troubled assets to restore
economic confidence and stimulate the economy. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201, 5211 (2006).
89. Brief for Appellants Indiana State Police Pension Trust et al., supra note 61, at 72.
90. Id. at 72–73.
91. Office of the Press Sec‘y, White House, Press Background Briefing on Auto Industry by
Senior Administration Officials (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/background-briefing-auto-industry-4302009.
92. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 114,
118–19 (2d Cir. 2009).
93. Lee, supra note 10, at 536 (citing Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of
Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV 751, 756 (2002)).
94. Id. at 537.
95. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 225–26 (1977) (explaining the purpose for requiring adequate
information with disclosure statements).
96. See Lee, supra note 10, at 535–37 (discussing undervaluation dangers in § 363 sales).
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study concluded that, though the costs were roughly the same, the § 363
sales were significantly worse for creditors.97 The reorganizations had a restart value averaging 80% of the book value of prior assets versus only
35% of book value for the sale price of assets in § 363 sales.98 Section
363(b) sales enable businesses to quickly take advantage of immediate and
fleeting opportunities to increase or maintain the value of assets.99
However, statistics clearly suggest that the companies and their creditors
are in fact getting just the opposite.100 One of the primary motivations
behind a § 363(b) sale, the expedited sale of assets to preserve value, is in
fact what hinders the ability to maximize that value in depressed
economies.101
F. Diminished Values in In re Chrysler
In the Chrysler proceedings, the bankruptcy court established
procedures for submitting bids for assets in less than two weeks.102
―Debtors also admitted that the bidding procedures were not likely to
produce bids for such a large complicated transaction in such a short period
of time.‖103 Subsequently, though Chrysler‘s assets had a going concern
value of roughly $25 billion, the § 363 sale distribution to the first-lien
lenders was calculated on the basis of a $2 billion dollar liquidation
analysis.104 Although this is a staggering discrepancy in valuation, statistics
show that such undervaluations are the norm, rather than the exception, in
§ 363 sales.105 Regardless, courts continue to allow § 363 proceedings,
which deprive assets, companies, and creditors of their value.106 These
staggering outcomes are made possible on account of bankruptcy courts‘
firmly established, easily manipulable § 363 business judgment
standard.107
In examining these issues, bankruptcy courts clearly recognize the
potential dangers of § 363 asset sales to the integrity of the system.108
97. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 3–4.
98. Id.
99. See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063,
1069 (2d Cir. 1983).
100. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 3–4.
101. Id.
102. Brief for Appellants Indiana State Police Pension Trust et al., supra note 61, at 14.
103. Id. at 14–15.
104. Id. at 10, 12; In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 89, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
105. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 3–4.
106. See, e.g., In re Torch Offshore, Inc., 327 B.R 254, 261 (E.D. La. 2005).
107. See Rose, supra note 86, at 275–77 (discussing the manipulation of the business
justification standard).
108. See, e.g., Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d
1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983) (establishing the business justification standard); Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing that an overbroad application of § 363(b) would circumvent the intent of Chapter 11);
Contrarian Funds, LLC v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc. (In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc.), 333 B.R. 30,
51–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (recognizing limits on § 363(b) authority to alter creditors‘ lien rights and
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Despite all of this evidence, the Second Circuit in Chrysler held that the
approval of the § 363(b) sale by the bankruptcy court was not improper.109
The Supreme Court subsequently vacated its temporary stay of the sale.110
However, in doing so, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the merits of
the case, and the major issues that arise under § 363 sales have yet to be
conclusively resolved.111 The Chrysler case unmistakably represents the
manifestation of major dangers in § 363(b) plans and, more importantly,
the ability under the business justification standard to approve questionable
asset sales under § 363(b). The issues raised by Chrysler represent an
opportunity for the courts to address a major flaw in § 363(b) application,
the business justification standard. The current application is simply too
manipulable and discretionary to provide adequate protection against the
vulnerabilities of § 363 abuse.
IV. THE PERMISSIVE STANDARD: BUSINESS JUSTIFICATIONS AND § 363
SALE APPROVALS
Bankruptcy courts have long recognized the need to refine the
requirements for § 363 asset sales.112 But it was not until In re Lionel, that
a definitive, non-emergency standard for approval was introduced. 113 This
standard, the business justification test remains the leading standard for
evaluating § 363 asset sales.114
A. The Original Business Justification Standard
The Second Circuit in In re Lionel correctly pointed out that, read
literally, § 363(b) seems to permit the sale of any property of the estate of a
corporate debtor without any regard for the safeguards of the Bankruptcy
Code.115 Yet, while the court did note that such a reading would be a
violation of the congressional scheme for reorganizations116 and declined
to extend ―carte blanche‖ to the bankruptcy judges in their assessments,117
it created a malleable standard for assessing § 363(b) sales.
―To balance the competing concerns of efficiency against the
safeguards of the Chapter 11 process,‖ In re Lionel required ―a good
finding limits to prevent circumvention of Chapter 11).
109. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108,
118–19 (2d Cir. 2009).
110. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2275, 2276 (2009).
111. Id. at 2276–77.
112. In re White Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584, 588 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (noting that
courts are split on the permissible scope of sales under § 363(b)). ―[T]o endow section 363 with the
purpose of or a potential for a total reorganization would nullify, at debtor‘s option, the major
protections and standards of chapter 11 of the Code.‖ Id. at 590.
113. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the view that § 363(b)
requires an emergency situation).
114. Rose, supra note 86, at 268.
115. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1069.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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business reason‖ for approval of a § 363(b) transaction.118 In providing
guidance on how to determine what constitutes sufficient business
justification, the court suggested a series of factors:
[A bankruptcy judge] should consider all salient factors
pertaining to the proceeding and, accordingly, act to further
the diverse interests of the debtor, creditors and equity
holders, alike. [A bankruptcy judge] might for example, look
to such relevant factors as the proportionate value of the asset
to the estate as a whole, the amount of elapsed time since the
filing, the likelihood that a plan of reorganization will be
proposed and confirmed in the near future, the effect of the
proposed disposition on future plans of reorganization, the
proceeds to be obtained from the disposition vis-a-vis any
appraisals of the property, which of the alternatives of use,
sale or lease the proposal envisions and, most importantly
perhaps, whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in
value. This list is not intended to be exclusive, but merely to
provide guidance to the bankruptcy judge.119
While these factors represent an attempt at establishing a process of
review for bankruptcy judges, the business justification standard does not
seem to include any safeguards against the concerns that prompted its
formation in the first place.120 In In re Lionel, the standard was initially
used to deny a § 363 sale but the standard has subsequently been the
rationale behind an increased number of sale approvals.121 Courts have
applied the standard inconsistently, relying on In re Lionel and other early
business justification cases only for factual comparisons.122 Thus, the
business justification analysis established in In re Lionel has proven to be a
discretionary and loose attempt at a standard, which does not provide a
significant degree of guidance to debtors and creditors as they approach the
§ 363 sale process.123
B. The Refined Standard
Because of the broad and variable application of the business
justification standard, the bankruptcy courts have subsequently attempted
118. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 114
(2d Cir. 2009).
119. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1071.
120. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122–29 (2006) (regulating disclosure, solicitation, acceptance, and
confirmation of plans).
121. See Brege, supra note 12, at 1654; Daniel M. Glosband, Pathology of Section 363 Sales:
Not as Simple as They Look, 7 J. PRIV. EQUITY No. 4, at 60 (2004).
122. Sloane, supra note 48, at 48, 51–53; see also Stephens Indus. v. McClung, 789 F.2d 386,
390 (6th Cir. 1986) (overruling the emergency rule in the Sixth Circuit and establishing the
business justification standard as the majority approach); In re Rausch Mfg. Co., 59 B.R. 501, 503
(Bankr. D. Minn, 1985).
123. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 51, at ¶ 1129.01[2].
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to increase justification scrutiny.124 In approving sales, judges have started
considering new factors, including the requirement of good faith in sale
proposals,125 dispositions that are ―fair and expeditious,‖126 and many
others. However, as with the original factors set out in the In re Lionel
standard, the newer factors and their supposed increased scrutiny are
interpreted as merely non-determinative considerations in case-specific
inquiries.127 Accordingly, scholars opine that these factors are simply
flexible additions to an already flexible standard.128 In determining the
meaning and scope of terms such as ―good faith‖ or ―fair,‖ courts have
simply relied on the sound business justification analysis.129 ―All of these
refinements have been added to the business justification standard in a
haphazard way, such that it is no longer clear which factors determine
whether a sale is permissible or how all of these factors relate to the actual
efficiency of a given sale.‖130 Thus, in spite of attempts to refine the
business justification standard, it essentially remains the same discretionary
and broad method for reviewing § 363(b) sales.131 Applied to the dangers
of sub rosa sales, creditor influence, the under valuation of assets, and
additional aspects of the § 363 sale process not discussed in this Note,132 it
becomes abundantly clear that loose business judgment standards can be
manipulated to obtain approval for § 363 sales that fall short of traditional
bankruptcy protections.

124. E.g., In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 169–70 (3d Cir. 1999); Mission Iowa Wind
Co. v. Enron Corp., 291 B.R. 39, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
125. In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 1986).
126. In re White Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584, 591 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981).
127. See, e.g, Solow v. PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc. (In re PPI Enters.), 324 F.3d 197, 211 n.22 (3d
Cir. 2003) (―[C]ourts have not identified with any consistency which circumstances of the debtor‘s
filing are indicia of good faith.‖).
128. Rachael M. Jackson, Survey, Responding to Threats of Bankruptcy Abuse in a PostEnron World: Trusting the Bankruptcy Judge as the Guardian of Debtor Estates, 2005 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 451, 493–94 (noting the aversion of bankruptcy courts to limiting judges‘ discretion).
129. See In re Condere Corp., 228 B.R. 615, 631, 636 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1998).
130. Brege, supra note 12, at 1654.
131. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108,
116–17 (2d Cir. 2009).
132. The subject is discussed elsewhere.
[T]he Business Judgment rule ought to be inapplicable to break up-fees in
bankruptcy cases. The complications of bankruptcy require the courts to conduct a
more thorough detailed analysis for every case. Thus, a new uniform and detailed
standard, with higher scrutiny than the judicial deference to the Business
Judgment Rule, is needed to give guidance to courts . . . .
Andrew S. Brown, Note, Breaking Up and Making Out (Rich): Recommendations for Revision of
Bankruptcy Code Provisions Governing Break-Up Fees Used by Stalking Horse Bidders in § 363
Bankruptcy Asset Sales, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1463, 1473 (2010).
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C. Finding Justification for § 363 Manipulations
The inconsistent business justification scrutiny afforded § 363 sales
and aggressive use of § 363 by debtors have left the current standard
unable to sufficiently shield the bankruptcy system from unfair dealing and
abuse.133 Faced with manipulated and improper § 363 sales, courts permit
such sales to prevent eminent worse alternatives such as total collapse of
the business.134 This happens because the business justifications presented
by the bankruptcy courts generally center around the savings of time or
money.135 Consequently, parties can manipulate the courts‘ application of
business justification by creating immediate necessity, which often serves
as an overriding factor when weighing the potential misuses of § 363
sales.136 Thus, the business justification standard provides a discretionary
loophole through which the courts sanction sub rosa reorganization,
creditor manipulation, extreme under valuation, and countless other
characteristics contrary to bankruptcy principles.
1. Justifying Sub Rosa Sales
In re Braniff established the impermissibility of sales that use § 363 to
achieve reorganization without standard Chapter 11 protections.137
Subsequently, analysis of whether a plan is sub rosa has developed into a
simple business judgment analysis.138 In approaching the sub rosa analysis,
courts have distorted the Braniff standard into a self-serving rationale:
The term ―sub rosa‖ is something of a misnomer. It
bespeaks a covert or secret activity, whereas secrecy has
nothing to do with a § 363 transaction. Transactions blessed
by the bankruptcy courts are openly presented, considered,
approved, and implemented. Braniff seems to have used ―sub
rosa‖ to describe transactions that treat the requirements of
the Bankruptcy Code as something to be evaded or subverted.

133. Rose, supra note 86, at 275.
134. See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 2001 WL 1820326, at *4 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr.
2, 2001) (stating in approval of a § 363 sale, ―TWA had no other strategic transaction available to it
and had no other offer for value to which it could turn.‖); In re Brookfield Clothes, Inc., 31 B.R.
978, 986 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating as justification for plan approval, ―[t]he absence of any
means on the part of the debtor to return the business to operation‖).
135. William T. Bodoh, John W. Kennedy & Joseph P. Mulligan, The Parameters of the NonPlan Liquidating Chapter Eleven: Refining the Lionel Standard, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 7 (1992).
136. Id. at 7, 9–10.
137. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700
F.2d 935, 939–40 (5th Cir. 1983).
138. See, e.g., Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d
108, 117 (2d Cir. 2009) (―[A] bankruptcy court confronted with [a sub rosa] allegation may
approve or disapprove a § 363(b) transfer that is a sale of all or substantially all of a debtor‘s assets,
using the analysis set forth in Lionel in order to determine whether there was a good business reason
for the sale.‖); In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 466–67 (2d Cir. 2007).
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But even in that sense, the term is unhelpful.139
Reworded, this explanation suggests that the court‘s position is that if a
plan is approved, then it is not a sub rosa plan because it was openly
presented and considered by the court prior to approval. Basically, a court‘s
approval of a § 363 sale effectively precludes the possibility that the plan is
an impermissible sub rosa sale only because the courts approval indicates
that it is not. Furthermore, as approval of such plans will be based on the
business justification standard, courts can approve sub rosa sales with the
justification that there is no superior alternative, and then use the approval
as the evidence that the sale is not sub rosa.140 This circular logic is
centered on the ability to approve § 363 sales with the business
justification standard. It is clearly the key component for manipulating a
bankruptcy court into approving sub rosa sales. Given the courts‘ aversion
to letting businesses collapse entirely and the broad scope of justifications
used to prevent this from happening, it is clear that, through the application
of business justification by the courts, § 363 sales are extremely vulnerable
to sub rosa manipulation and abuse.
2. Justifying Creditor Manipulation
Creditor influence in § 363 asset sales is not necessarily an
unacceptable characteristic which taints the bankruptcy process.141
However, creditor influence and control do become an issue when
powerful creditors, for their own purposes, dictate sales that do not
adequately or appropriately serve the interests of other less influential
parties to the transaction.142 This issue becomes a problem when the
business justification standard allows such manipulation to happen.143
Although the In re Lionel court found that the appeasement of major
creditors did not amount to a good business justification,144 the
considerable deference given to saving time and money gives creditors the
ability to dictate § 363 plans and outcomes.145 As businesses struggle or
approach failure, they have the ability to manufacture an emergency by
delaying bankruptcy filings until the last possible moment.146 Large, highly
vested creditors are invariably involved in the bankruptcy and
reorganization processes to protect their interests and investments.147 Thus,
139. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 117.
140. See id. at 117–19.
141. Lee, supra note 10, at 550.
142. See id. at 548–50.
143. E.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 119 (approving a plan in which first-lien lenders
received $6 billion less than the value of their debt while the major creditor, the U.S. Treasury,
received substantial considerations as well).
144. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063,
1070–72 (2d Cir. 1983).
145. See, e.g., Bodoh, Kennedy & Mulligan, supra note 135, at 7.
146. There is no rule requiring businesses to file for bankruptcy; they are free to file or fight to
preserve the business at their discretion.
147. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 14 (4th ed. 2006).
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large influential creditors can influence the manufacture of debtor
emergencies in an attempt to restrict the court‘s ability to deny § 363
sales.148 The immediate need to keep a business operating as a going
concern provides the courts‘ business justification for allowing debtors and
major creditors to push through their own pet deals. The lack of required
notice,149 the burden for objections,150 and the courts‘ reluctance to
disallow approved plans,151 all generally deny remaining dissatisfied
creditors the ability to do anything about it.
3. Justifying Meager Sale Values
As previously stated, the primary objective of business reorganization
in bankruptcy has always been to preserve the value of debtor‘s assets as a
going concern.152 In regard to preserving value in § 363 sales, courts have
held that one of the overriding goals is to maximize rather than restrict
bidding.153 In justifying values obtained in § 363 sales, the courts have
afforded much deference to the sales‘ open market bidding practices.154
However, this business justification wrongly presupposes the openness and
competition on the market.155 Markets cannot assess deal protection fees,
credit bidding, and the disparity in available information.156 The debtor‘s
power to restrict participants in open auctions makes the market exposure
standard insufficient as an objective standard.157 These factors, coupled
with the expedited nature of § 363 sales, hinder true and informed open
competition and hamper the market‘s ability to return full or competitive
value for assets. Thus, while the bankruptcy code is intended to provide a
way for creditors to receive the greatest possible recovery,158 through
business justification, the courts are approving § 363 sales that return
values inherently contrary to this recovery principle.159 Under the old § 363
standard of strict emergency and perishable goods, these low values may
have been unavoidable and justifiable.160 However, the changed nature of
148. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2009).
149. Contra In re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85, 88 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988).
150. See Institutional Creditors of Cont‘l Air Lines v. Cont‘l Air Lines, Inc., (In re Cont‘l Air
Lines), 780 F.2d 1223, 1227–28 (5th Cir. 1986).
151. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 40. (―[W]e know of no modern case in which a
large public company debtor proposed a sale and the court refused to approve it.‖).
152. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513. 527–28 (1984).
153. E.g., In re Beck Indus., Inc., 605 F.2d 624, 637 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Ohio Corrugating
Co., 59 B.R. 11, 13 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
154. E.g., In re Torch Offshore, Inc., 327 B.R. 254, 258 (E.D. La. 2005) (expressing
satisfaction with the returned value for assets after an auction producing multiple bids in less than
one day).
155. See Rose, supra note 86, at 282–83.
156. Id. at 282.
157. Id.
158. BARRY E. ADLER, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 1–3 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the function of bankruptcy law).
159. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 3–4.
160. Brege, supra note 12, at 1650–51.
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§ 363 and its application dictates that courts‘ must reform or reassess
entrenched business justification rationale or risk continually approving a
valuation processes contrary to fundamental bankruptcy principles.
There is no question that the business justification standard and its
case-by-case factorial analysis has enabled the approval of extremely
questionable § 363 asset sales.161 While, in the past, the business judgment
standard may have served the courts‘ purposes and traditional bankruptcy
standards, ―now that Section 363(b) sales have become ubiquitous, it is
worth investigating whether this choice remains optimal . . . .‖162 In
upholding the business judgment standard, even the bankruptcy courts
have recognized the difficulties it presents.163 In light of these difficulties
and the growing prevalence of § 363(b) sales, the shortcomings of the
business judgment standard must be addressed in order to preserve the
fundamental principles of bankruptcy protection.
While this Note does not seek to address the level of integrity of the
bankruptcy court system, it must also be mentioned that some academics
suggest that § 363 sales result in poor recoveries because of corruption and
self-dealing within the courts.164 Although this argument may be a ―giant
blind leap,‖165 this argument highlights potential holes in the system that,
at some point, must be addressed.166
V. IMPROVING THE CURRENT STANDARD
There are plenty of scholarly approaches to refining the bankruptcy
business judgment standard, all of which have yet to be adopted by the
courts.167 However, there are two approaches in particular that, though
limited individually, can together form the foundation of a framework for a
better business judgment standard. Jason Brege, now a North Carolina
attorney, suggests a strict efficiency based rule that removes discretion and
ambiguity from the § 363(b) approval process.168 Commentator Elizabeth
Rose, on the other hand, suggests procedural adjustments to allow
objecting parties access to more information while still preserving courts‘
discretion throughout the process.169 While both approaches may prove
functional in some circumstances, each has limitations that prevent it from
being the ideal solution. Interestingly, in scholars‘ and the courts‘
approach to implementing the business judgment standard, neither has
161. See supra Part III.
162. Brege, supra note 12, at 1652.
163. See, e.g., Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d
108, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2009) (―As §363(b) sales proliferate, the competing concerns identified in
Lionel have become harder to manage.‖).
164. LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 39–41 (arguing that competition among courts for
cases causes judges to blindly approve sales by debtors).
165. Athanas, supra note 13, at 48.
166. Lee, supra note 10, at 541.
167. E.g., Brege, supra note 12, at 1642; Rose, supra note 86, at 251.
168. See Brege, supra note 12, at 1658–59, 1673.
169. See Rose, supra note 86, at 283–84.
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made significant use or mention of the application of the corporate
business judgment standard.170 Taking certain corporate business judgment
principles into account, along with both the Brege and Rose approaches to
the bankruptcy rule, this Note offers an alternative, compromising
approach to the business justification standard.
A. Strict § 363 Sales: The Efficiency-Based Rule
Brege centers his rule-based analysis on the principle that § 363(b)
sales must be approved only when they are efficient.171 Brege describes
efficiency as, ―when the total value of the sale is greater than the value that
would have been recovered through reorganization plus the transaction cost
waste incurred in promulgating the sale.‖172 For Brege, the value of the sale
is the present value received for the sold asset, the value through
reorganization is the expected present value of the asset under a
reorganization pathway, and the transaction cost waste is the costs involved
in selling the asset under § 363(b).173 He also accurately points out that
inherent in the costs of transactions is the previously mentioned danger of
over-influence by major creditors.174 Although such costs are the most
difficult of the factors to calculate or predict, under Brege‘s rule, this cost
and creditor issue is theoretically moot if the value received in the § 363
sale is higher than by any other means.175 Brege also undertakes a step-bystep analysis of his formula and how it either addresses or negates all of the
factors for consideration under the current business judgment analysis.176
However, while efficiency is ideal and should be the goal of any
§ 363(b) sale, Brege‘s strict analysis fails to account for the mitigating
circumstances and fact-specific characteristics of individual bankruptcy
filings. Nowhere does the analysis take into account the possibility that,
though inefficient under this formula, a § 363(b) sale may be necessary to
allow a business to continue operation. If the value received under § 363
sale would not be as high as under reorganization, then the inefficient plan
would fail. However, the Brege approach ignores the likely collapse of a
company that needed the proceeds from such an inefficient sale to continue
operations. Courts adopting this strict standard run the risk of denying
businesses the ability to continue operating. Such a standard would
wrongly ―straightjacket the bankruptcy judge so as to prevent him from
doing what is best for the estate.‖177 Given the trend in the size and
170. In all the research done for this Note, not once in any court case or scholarly work was the
corporate business judgment standard referenced in relation to bankruptcy courts‘ interpretation and
implementation of the same rule.
171. See Brege, supra note 12, at 1659.
172. Id. (stating efficiency = V sale > E reorganization + W sale) For an in-depth breakdown
on how each of these factors is calculated, see id. at 1659–73.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1669.
175. Id. at 1670–71.
176. See Brege, supra note 12, at 1673–79.
177. Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1069
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relevance of the businesses recently attempting § 363(b) asset sales and the
danger of denying such businesses the ability to continue, this strict rule
must be limited in its application to have any place in the business
justification analysis.178 The best use of the Brege approach is as a brightline standard or analysis to be used by courts or debtors to refute frivolous
or unfounded objections by creditors to § 363 sales. Thus, any efficient
plan under the Brege model would be easily approvable by the courts as the
most valuable and desirable outcome under the circumstances. However,
inefficient plans should not be disposed of right away as Brege suggests
and as public policy prohibits. Inefficient plans may still be necessary and
are, therefore, in need of further consideration by the courts.
B. Informed § 363 Sales: Procedural Improvements
In her attempts to refine the business justification rule, Rose offers
procedurally based improvements as a solution.179 Her goal is to create
more transparent, supervised, and thus, less vulnerable § 363 sales.180 Rose
argues that this can be accomplished in two ways.181 The first is that
objectors to sales have the option to extend the notice period for cause
shown, with a low showing standard on account of objectors‘ time and
informational disadvantage.182 The second is ―a tiered system for debtor
disclosure requirements.‖183 Under Rose‘s approach, non-suspect sales
need only conform to current notice and hearing requirements, while courts
should consider heightened requirements for good faith creditor
objections.184 The requests for additional disclosure would still be at the
discretion of the courts, which would assess the reasonableness by
performing a cost-benefit analysis between the debtor and objecting
party.185 The courts could then, if they chose, require formal disclosure
statements in conformity with standard Chapter 11 adequate information
standards.186
Although it does greatly increase the potential flow of information
between all of the parties, better enables them to make informed and fair
decisions, and preserves some of the courts‘ discretionary authority, Rose‘s
(2d Cir. 1983).
178. See U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980–2009, AM. BANKR. INST., http://www.abiworld.org/
AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID
=57826 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) (showing the total number of businesses filing for bankruptcy
increased considerably between 2006 and 2008); see also Ind. State Police Pension Trust v.
Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that in the last
twenty-five years, § 363(b) asset sales have become standard practice in large corporate
bankruptcies).
179. See Rose, supra note 86, at 283–84.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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approach does not appear to take into account the considerable delays it
may create. Lesser-preferred creditors that do not receive the full value of
their interest and have limited access to information would likely make
ignorant yet good faith objections even if a proposed plan was the best
possible outcome. Easily attainable extension of the notice period on these
grounds, followed potentially by multiple disclosure hearings and
requirements, considerably lengthen the § 363 plan process. Rose, herself,
recognized that additional requirements and more rigid standards
effectively eliminate the advantages of § 363 sales.187 Rose‘s framework
for notice and disclosure appears extremely vulnerable to misuse and abuse
by dissatisfied creditors hoping to stall out or defeat § 363 processes. In
order to increase available information and fairness, as Rose suggests,
while still preserving the effectiveness of the § 363 sale, a base line
standard or rule must exist to protect the system from imposing excessive
and efficiency-defeating requirements.
The Brege approach could provide the needed base line standard with
which to protect Rose‘s procedural safeguards from abuse. Sufficient
showing of cause for extended notice and disclosure requirements could be
determined by Brege‘s efficiency analysis. A Brege efficient plan would
defeat creditors‘ objections and would rapidly direct the sale toward
approval. On the other hand, an inefficient plan under the Brege standard
should serve as caution to the courts in regards to the sale. Inefficiency
would thus constitute sufficient cause for an increased notice period or
grounds for a determination as to expanded disclosure requirements.
Ultimately, however, the determination for expanded disclosure or later on,
approval as a whole, would come down to the same business justification
analysis. It is at this point that the application of corporate business
judgment principles provides a good deal of guidance.
C. The Other Standard: The Corporate Business Judgment Rule
While an in-depth analysis of the corporate business judgment rule is
beyond the scope of this Note, a glance at its principles and limitations
offers some insight into potential improvements of the equivalent
bankruptcy standard. The corporate business judgment rule is, in effect, the
presumption by courts that directors making non-self-interested business
decisions act in good faith and with due care.188 The policy reasons for the
corporate rule are much the same as those offered for the bankruptcy
standard.189 Essentially, the justification holds that directors rather than the
courts are charged with management of the business and because of their
experience and access to information are better able to make business
decisions.190 ―The business judgment rule, therefore, recognizes that courts
are ill-equipped to second guess the validity of complex business decisions
187. Id.
188. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986).
189. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS.
LAW 1437, 1441 (1985).
190. Id.
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made by directors and officers.‖191 As they were put into effect with the
same goals and policy concerns in mind, the relevant and applicable part of
the corporate rule, with respect to bankruptcy application analysis, is when
it does not apply.
The corporate business judgment rule is not an absolute rule; instead, it
contains a series of exceptions under which it does not apply.192 For the
purpose of bankruptcy application, two of the exceptions are of
considerable importance. The first is that the rule does not apply if the
plaintiff can show self-dealing, where directors are on both sides of a
transaction or have a person financial interest in it.193 The second is that
the business judgment rule does not apply when there is any action by a
board to prevent the effectiveness of a shareholder vote.194
With respect to self-interested transactions, one court stated, ―there is
no alternative to a judicial evaluation of the fairness of the terms of the
transaction other than the unacceptable one of leaving shareholders
unprotected.‖195 However, approval of a transaction by the majority of the
remaining, disinterested directors is seen as strong evidence that the
business judgment rule should apply.196
Applied to the bankruptcy law, a similar rationale may be beneficial. If
self-interest is found on the part of those involved in § 363 sales, the sale
should be subject to greater Chapter 11 scrutiny. Self-interest would not
refer to the debtors themselves, who will always be a financially interested
party to both sides of the deal, but to major creditors whose interest
extends beyond simply the repayment of their interest through the sale of
assets. Interest such as creditor involvement in future reorganization
financing, or substantial control in the affairs of the debtor or newly
created entity, would be strong evidence of a self-interested transaction in
need of greater protections. Additionally, as with the corporate standard,
approval of the transaction by the majority of the remaining, disinterested
creditors should be seen as strong evidence that only the business judgment
rule need apply.
In regard to actions by the board to prevent the effectiveness of voter
approval, ―[a]ction designed principally to interfere with the effectiveness
of a vote inevitably involves a conflict between the board and a
shareholder majority. Judicial review of such action involves a
determination of the legal and equitable obligations of an agent towards his
principal.‖197 Applied to bankruptcy, this standard would essentially
191. EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES §2:12 (rev. online ed. Thomson Reuters 2011).
192. See DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 12 (3d ed. 1989) (explaining that, for the
business judgment rule to apply, directors must be disinterested, exercise due care, act in good faith,
and not abuse discretion or waste corporate assets).
193. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624, 627 (Del. 1984).
194. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659–60 (Del. Ch. 1988).
195. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986).
196. E.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988).
197. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660.
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prevent the business justification analysis from applying to § 363 sales in
which approval by the majority of creditors is seen to be wrongly
influenced by self-interested creditors to the transaction. Instead, the
judicial review by bankruptcy courts should involve the legal obligation of
a debtor to his creditors under Chapter 11 bankruptcy standards.
As suggested, the Brege and Rose approaches do not separately
articulate a practical alternative to the business justification analysis.
However, when combined and included in conjunction with corporate
limitation principles, they create a practical, tenable alternative to the
current § 363 standard. This new analytical framework addresses the
limitations of both the Brege and Rose approaches while preserving the
discretion of the courts and respecting the time sensitive nature of § 363(b)
asset sales.
VI. REFINING AND COMBINING APPROACHES: A BETTER STANDARD
The first question under a refined new § 363 analysis is, as proposed by
Brege, whether the transaction is efficient. If the transaction as proposed is
efficient, it is mathematically the best possible outcome under the
circumstances.198 Courts should thus liberally and rapidly proceed to
approval in spite of creditor objections and without a need for lengthy
further analysis. However, if a transaction is inefficient, it should not
automatically fail, as Brege suggests.199 Such a strict interpretation ignores
the possibility that inefficient transactions are still necessary to preserve
businesses and jobs as a matter of public policy.
Instead, if the transaction is not efficient under the Brege model, the
absence of efficiency should serve as sufficient cause for added notice
under the Rose approach.200 The lack of efficiency of the transaction
indicates that the value gained in the § 363 asset sale is actually less than
would be gained in standard reorganization plans.201 Thus, the additional
delay caused by increasing the notice period would not defeat the
effectiveness of § 363. The lower immediate sale value under § 363 is a
strong indicator time is not of the essence. This extended notice need not
be of considerable duration, instead only long enough for the courts to
continue on to the additional disclosure considerations under the Rose
approach.202
Unlike in Rose‘s approach, disclosure analysis should not hinge on a
balance of the inconvenience to the debtor and the benefit to the objecting
party.203 Instead, as with corporate principles, the courts‘ consideration for
disclosure should focus on the appearance of self-dealing or manipulation
of creditor approval. Such consideration still affords the courts limited, but
not absolute, discretion. Courts are free to determine the amount of
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See Brege, supra note 12, at 1659–73.
See id. at 1672 (suggesting that if a transaction is inefficient, it should not be pursued).
See Rose, supra note 86, at 283.
Brege, supra note 12, at 1659–73.
See Rose, supra note 86, at 284.
Id.
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involvement and influence they are willing to permit before the integrity of
a transaction is compromised. For transactions in which there is an
indication of self-dealing or creditor manipulation, courts should require
additional disclosure in accordance with Chapter 11 principles. Additional
factors that the court deems suspect, such as the subrogation of creditor
rights, could be added to those that prompt greater scrutiny. The additional
time and scrutiny needed are justified by the potential danger and the
apparent existence of impropriety and misuse in the § 363 transaction. If
courts find insufficient self-dealing or manipulation, then no additional
disclosure or scrutiny requirements are necessary. The standard current
business justification factors and analysis should then apply as courts
determine whether non-suspect Brege inefficient transactions are justified
under the circumstances.204
Refined § 363 Review Procedure
Objection to § 363 Sale

Is the Plan Efficient?
Yes

Objection Defeated: Plan
Approval

No

Sufficient Cause Shown
for Added Notice

Is there self-dealing or
creditor manipulations?
Yes

Heightened Disclosure Req.:
Ch. 11 Scrutiny

No

No additional Disclosure:
Standard Business Justification

204. See supra Part V.C.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The total number of businesses filing for bankruptcy increased by
nearly 10,000 from 2006 to 2007, and by more than 15,000 from 2007 to
2008.205 As previously stated, of the twenty largest public company
bankruptcy filings since 1980, seventeen have taken place since 2001, and
ten of those seventeen were filed between March of 2007 and August of
2009.206 These statistics highlight the eminent importance of bankruptcy
law, especially with regard to the increasingly pervasive § 363(b) asset
sales. Whether in this recession or in the future, as these massive
companies fail, they will turn to § 363(b) to survive. Therefore,
considering the size and influence of the businesses at stake, ensuring the
proper application and analysis of § 363(b) sales is imperative. The
business justification standard as an analytical tool is no longer sufficient
to prevent the potential misuse of § 363(b) by increasingly knowledgeable
and desperate debtors and creditors. Courts must adopt a new standard that
protects the principles of bankruptcy against fraudulent uses of § 363
without eliminating its essential advantages or restricting the courts‘ ability
to effectively govern increasingly intricate and unique bankruptcy
transactions.

205. See U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980–2009, supra note 178.
206. See 20 Largest Public Company Bankruptcy Filings 1980—Present, supra note 1.
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